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THE ARIZONAJURY REFORM PERMITTING CIVIL JURY





In 1995, the Arizona Supreme Court reformed the jury trial process by allowing
civil jurors to discuss the evidence presented during trial prior to their formal de-
liberations. This Article examines and evaluates the theoretical, legal, and policy
issues raised by this reform and presents the early results of afield experiment that
tested the impact of trial discussions. Jurors, judges, attorneys, and litigants in
civil jury trials in Arizona were questioned regarding their observations, experi-
ences, and reactions during trial as well as what they perceived to be the benefits
and drawback of juror discussions. The data revealed that the majority of judges
and jurors support juror discussions during trial while attorneys and litigants
are divided in their views of this reform. The study also revealed that experience
with the reform appears to increase support for it. Although the impact of the re-
form on the jury decision making processes remains unclear, these early findings
provide some insight into the effects of reforming the juror deliberation process.
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Arizona approved a sweeping set
of changes in the state's jury system. Many of these changes were
designed to allow jurors to participate more actively in the
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fact-finding process. Perhaps the most controversial change was
that civil jurors are now allowed to discuss the evidence amongst
themselves as the trial progresses, rather than wait until the end of
the trial as had been the regular practice. During these discussions,
all jurors must be present in the deliberation room, and jurors are
admonished to keep an open mind and avoid debating verdict op-
tions.
This Article has three aims: to present the theoretical, legal, and
policy issues raised by the reform permitting juror discussions dur-
ing trial; to describe a field experiment that we conducted, with
the cooperation of the Arizona courts, that examines and evaluates
this legal reform; and to present some of the early results of the
field experiment about views of the reform. Although we do not
yet know the impact of the reform on jury decision making proc-
esses, we do have data about how often jurors engage in trial
discussions when they are permitted to do so and how judges, ju-
rors, attorneys, and litigants view the reform.
I. THEORETICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES RAISED
BY JURY TRIAL DISCUSSIONS
The changes instituted by the Arizona courts are part of a
broad, nationwide effort to reform and improve the jury system.' A
set of controversial jury decisions, including hotly contested ac-
quittals in the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial and the Rodney
King beating trial, have led many Americans to question the extent
to which racial and other prejudices infect jury verdicts. 2 Concerns
about the jury's ability to comprehend and apply complex evi-
dence and legal rules in complicated modern trials have
encouraged some authors to argue for restricting the right to a
civil jury or for limiting the kinds of evidence thatjuries may hear.s
At the same time, there is growing recognition that many tradi-
tional trial procedures contribute to the problems that juries face
in comprehending evidence and applying the law to arrive at their
1. See G. Thomas Munsterman & Paula L. Hannaford, Reshaping the Bedrock of Democ-
racy: American Jury Reform During the Last 30 Years, JUDGES' J., Fall 1997, at 5, 5-7 (discussing
recentjury reform initiatives).
2. See Valerie P. Hans & Jonathan D. Casper, Trial byJury, the Legitimacy of the Courts,
and Crime Contro4 in THE CRIME CONUNDRUM: ESSAYS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 93, 99-100
(Lawrence M. Friedman & George Fisher eds., 1997).
3. See generally Valerie P. Hans & Andrea J. Appel, The Jury on Trial, in HANDBOOK OF
JURY RESEARCH (Walter F. Abbott &John Batt eds., forthcoming 1999).
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verdicts.4 In the idealized model of the adversary system, attorneys
for each side develop the evidence and present it to a neutral and
largely passive decision maker.5 This is distinguished from an in-
quisitorial system in which the decision maker takes a more active
role in the development of evidence.6 A key assumption underlying
the adversary system is that the neutrality of decision makers is en-
hanced when they are not actively involved in the evidence
gathering and presentation.7
The notion of the jury as a largely passive decision making body
has been challenged by research in cognitive and social psychology
and in the expanding field of jury studies. That work shows that
8jurors are more aptly characterized as active decision makers.
Rather than the mythical blank slates who wait until the close of a
trial to decide a verdict, jurors bring a host of attitudes and as-
sumptions with them to the jury box and actively construct
explanations for the evidence as they listen to it.9 One recent law
review article argues that, because jurors often discuss the evidence
among themselves informally and are prone to make up their
minds early in the trial, the traditional adversarial approach can-
not succeed and should be supplanted by procedures that
acknowledge juries' active approach to decision making. 10 In par-
ticular, jurors should be allowed to discuss the evidence during
trial under carefully controlled circumstances. I
1
The Arizona jury reforms adopted in 1995 capitalized on the ac-
tive approach that jurors take to their decision making task by
encouraging note taking and question asking, permitting civil
4. See, e.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen
Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Juiy Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727 (1991);
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1989, at 205, 205.
5. See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE
2-3 (1984) (explaining the importance of the neutrality and passivity of the decision maker
in an adversary system).
6. See ELLEN HOCHSTEDLER STEURY & NANCY FRANK, CRIMINAL COURT PROCESS 94-
96 (1996) (describing the history of the inquisitorial system).
7. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 7-40 (1988) (describing studies of adversarial versus inquisitorial procedures).
8. See, e.g., HASTIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 24; Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D.
Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the CivilJuty, 26 LAw
& Soc'Y REv. 513, 515-17, 557-58 (1992).
9. See, e.g., HASTIE ET AL., supra note 4; Vicki L. Smith, How Jurors Make Decisions: The
Value of Trial Innovations, inJuRY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 5, 9-12 (G. Thomas Munsterman et
al. eds., 1997); B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights": Creating Educated
and DemocraticJuries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1242 (1993).
10. See Natasha K. Lakamp, Comment, Deliberating Juror Predeliberation Discussions:
Should California Follow the Arizona Model?, 45 UCLA L. REv. 845, 853-55 (1998).
11. See id. at 855-61.
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jurors to discuss the evidence among themselves during the trial,
and providing for additional instruction by the judge and argu-
ment by the parties to deadlocked juries.
12
Of all the reforms, permitting civil jurors to discuss the evidence
among themselves during an ongoing trial has generated the most
controversy. 3 Courts and scholars alike have recognized that some
discussion among jurors during the trial probably occurs, and it is
extremely difficult to control. Loftus and Leber estimated that over
ten percent of the jurors they studied talked about the facts of the
case with other jurors or their friends and family during the trial.
4
The problem is assumed to be worse in lengthy cases, particularly
with sequestered juries.' 5 Nevertheless, Arizona remains the only
state with a permanent rule permitting its civil jurors to discuss the
evidence during the trial.
II. LEGAL ISSUES
Legal opinions about the practice of jurors discussing evidence
during trial reflect a near consensus against it. 6 Consequently, the
Arizona reform explicitly providing for juror discussions is consid-
ered to be a radical innovation in jury trial procedures. While
courts are nearly unanimous in condemning the practice, a close
reading of relevant decisions reveals a diverse set of justifications
for the prohibition of juror discussions and a surprising amount of
disagreement about the ultimate objective to be gained from pro-
hibiting such discussions. 7 A review of existing judicial decisions
demonstrates that judges do not always agree on an appropriate
remedy when jurors discuss the case prematurely. 8 Indeed, the
primary debate among appellate courts is whether an instruction
12. See Arizona Supreme Court Orders, Nos. R-94-0031, R-92-0004 (1995).
13. SeeJanessa E. Shtabsky, Comment, A More Active Juy: Has Arizona Set the Standard
for Reform with its NewJury Rules?, 28 ARz. ST. L.J. 1009, 1026-31 (1996).
14. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Douglas Leber, Do Jurors Talk?, TRIAL,Jan. 1986, at 59, 60.
15. See Raymond T. DeMeo, Comment, Containing the Irrepressible: Judicial Responses to
the Problem ofPre-Deliberation Discussion AmongJurors, 18 CONN. L. REV. 127, 127 (1985). In the
O.J. Simpson trial, prosecutor Marcia Clark assumed that the sequestered jurors' conjugal
and family visits included discussions of the trial. See MARCIA CiARK wiTH TERESA CARPEN-
TER, WITHOUT A DOUBT 444 (1997). Clark writes: "Keep in mind that all of this was going
on in open court. The jurors weren't present, but the proceedings were being broadcast, so
their families could hear and see it all. I shuddered to think what information they were
imparting to their sequestered loved ones during visiting hours.. . . "Id.
16. See infra notes 22-52 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
18. See infta notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
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permitting juror discussions is reversible or merely harmless er-
ror. 9 It should be noted that most of the published opinions are in
criminal cases, although the issue of the appropriateness of juror
discussions during trial has arisen in civil cases from time to time."
Winebrenner v. United States,2 one of the first cases to address the
question ofjuror trial discussions, reviews six of the most common
justifications for the prohibition.2 2 Two of these involve beliefs
about juror behavior. The first focuses on the effect that the se-
quence of evidence at trial has on juror decision making. 23 "f...
jurors . . . discuss the case among themselves," wrote the Winebren-
ner court, "they are giving premature consideration to the
evidence."24 Because the prosecution (or plaintiff in civil cases)
presents its case first, premature consideration of the evidence was
believed to be necessarily prejudicial to the defendant. 25 Having
formed an initial opinion about the prosecution's case, the court
stated: "[The juror's] inclination thereafter would be to give special
attention to such testimony as to his mind strengthened, con-
firmed or vindicated the views which he had already expressed to
his fellowjurors . .
The Winebrenner court continued, quoting Chief Justice Mar-
shall: "'[The juror] will listen with more favor to that testimony
which confirms, than to that which would change his opinion; it is
not to be expected that he will weigh evidence or argument as
fairly as a man whose judgment is not made up in the case.' ,27
The Winebrenner court warned that the act of discussing the case
tended to fix jurors' opinions permanently, making them unlikely
19. Compare, e.g., Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 327-29 (8th Cir. 1945)
(reversible error), State v. Washington, 438 A.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Conn. 1980) (reversible
error), People v. Monroe, 270 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Mich. 1978) (reversible error), and Com-
monwealth v. Kerpan, 498 A.2d 829, 832 (Pa. 1985) (reversible error), with Wilson v. State,
242 A.2d 194, 198-99 (Md. 1968) (harmless error).
20. Cf., e.g., Hunt v. Methodist Hosp., 485 N.W.2d 737, 742-45 (Neb. 1992)
(discussing the impropriety of pre-submissionjuror discussions).
21. 147 F.d 322 (8th Cir. 1945).
22. See id. 327-29. Winebrenner involved an appeal by multiple defendants convicted of
conspiracy to commit fraud in the procurement of government contracts. See id. at 323.
During the trial, the judge instructed the jury that although they could not discuss the case
with others, they could discuss it among themselves. See id. at 326. After ruling on an objec-
tion by the defendants' counsel, the court later clarified its instruction: "The result that is
sought to be accomplished is that you not discuss the case before you to such an extent that
you form definite, fixed ideas that would prevent you from changing after you had heard all of the
evidence in the case." Id. at 327.




27. Id. (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50 (C. C. D. Va. 1807) (No.
14 ,692g) (Marshall, CJ.)).
WINTR 1999]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform[
to change their minds even if evidence presented later in the trial
would warrant it: "[H] ad there been no discussion and no expres-
sion of tentative opinion, he would not be confronted with
embarrassment before his fellow jurors should he change the ten-
tative opinion which he might entertain from hearing evidence. 
28
Two of the justifications offered by the Winebrenner court, and
echoed in many later decisions, reflect a judicial belief in the im-
mutability of trial procedures.29 Indeed, the Winebrenner court
emphasized the importance of procedural regularity in jury trials.30
One aspect of procedural regularity is the timing of jury instruc-
tions, which historically are given after the presentation of all of
the evidence and closing arguments by counsel.31 The court ex-
plained:
[I] t must be borne in mind that the jurors are unschooled
and inexperienced as to their duties in a criminal case, and
they are not instructed as to those duties until all the evidence
has been received.... Without admonition their course is
uncharted. Thus, it is not until the final submission of the
case that the jurors are told that a defendant is under the law
presumed to be innocent and not guilty and that that pre-
sumption attends him throughout the trial, so that it is
incumbent upon the Government to prove the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
32
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
30. "[The trial court's obligation to preserve the accused's right to a trial by jury] ...
'is not to be discharged as a mere matter of rote, but... with an eye to avoid unreasonable
or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any of the essential elements
thereof...." Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 328-29 (quoting Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 312-13(1930)).
A Pennsylvania court that followed the reasoning in Winebrenner was even stronger in its
condemnation of modifications to jury trial procedures. In Commonwealth v. Kerpan, 498
A.2d 829 (Pa. 1985), the court held that the trial judge's "experimental" instruction that
jurors could discuss questions with one another, and if no satisfactory answers were pro-
vided, could submit them to the court, was reversible error. See id. at 831. Indeed, the court
found that the defense attorney's consent to the instruction constituted ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. See id. at 832. "Agreements that precede conviction can often prove watery
reeds, and departures from the beaten paths into areas of 'experiment' are fraught with
dangers." Id.
31. See generally William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575, 583-85
(1990) (discussing both final instructions and the legal authority and practical and theoreti-
cal justifications for preinstructions). For fuller discussion of preinstructions, see
Munsterman et al.,JuRY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 151-53 (1997).
32. Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 327-28.
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Another aspect of procedural regularity is the requirement that
the jury only undertakes its deliberations as a collective body,
rather than in smaller groups of individual jurors:
This admonition ... permitted groups or coteries within the
jury, including the alternate juror, to discuss the case during
the many weeks the Government was introducing evidence
... defendants were entitled to have the case considered not
by divisions or coteries of jurors, which might include the al-
ternate juror, but by the entire jury."
The court's last two justifications for prohibiting juror discus-
sions are actually the legal conclusions that arise from the first
four. The court held that an admonition permitting juror discus-
sions prior to deliberations unconstitutionally violated the
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process34 and Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury. 5 The Winebrenner court
concluded that permitting juror discussions has the practical effect
of shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defen-
dant in violation of the defendant's due process rights.3
6
Later courts would echo many of the same underlying justifica-
tions for prohibiting juror discussions, although not all of them
would reach the same conclusions about the constitutionality (or
lack thereof) of judicial instructions permitting jurors to discuss
the evidence during the trial. In Wilson v. State, 7 for example, the
33. Id. at 329.
34. See id. at 327. Later courts would replace the reference to the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment with that of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Holland v. State,
587 So. 2d 848, 873 (Miss. 1991).
35. See Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 327. Civil cases implicate the Seventh Amendment,
rather than the Sixth Amendment, guarantee of an impartial jury. See, e.g., Hunt v. Method-
ist Hosp., 485 N.W.2d 737, 743 (Neb. 1992).
36. See Winebrenner, 147 F.2d at 328. The court continued:
Under the court's admonition .... [a juror's opinion] of necessity could result from
a discussion of only a part of the evidence, the evidence not having all been submit-
ted. Such an opinion once formed could only be removed, if at all, by evidence. This
in effect shifted the burden of proof and placed upon the defendants the burden of
changing by evidence the opinion thus formed.'
Id.
37. 242 A.2d 194 (Md. 1968) (convicting defendant of manslaughter, but acquitting
defendant of murder). The court stated:
We do not agree that it necessarily follows that an accused is denied a fair trial and
due process of law because of the absence of an admonition not to discuss the case
WINTER 1999]
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court disagreed with the Winebrenner decision: "[T] he refusal of the
trial judge to admonish the jury not to discuss the case among
themselves in the jury room or even the possibility that they did
discuss it does not present a matter of constitutional dimension."38
Focusing instead on the objectives of the admonition prohibit-
ing juror discussions, the Wilson court found that the purpose was
"to avoid any outside influences and to cause the jury's final verdict
to be based solely on the evidence and on the whole of the evi-
dence presented in court... ."" Similarly, the court in United States
v. Meester held that the trial judge's instruction that jurors could
"chit-chat" about the case was not plain error requiring reversal
because the instruction included a lengthy admonition that jurors
should not reach a decision.4' And in Meggs v. Fair,2 the court
opined in dicta that "the judge's admonition to the jury members
not to commit themselves until 'you hear all the evidence and hear
arguments and then my instructions' minimized any danger to the
defendant."
43
Cases in which the trial judge instructed the jurors that they
might discuss the case prior to deliberation are not the only occa-
sions that this issue has been raised on appeal. In some instances,
judges have failed to give an instruction prohibiting juror discus-
sions.4 In other cases, the jurors have discussed the case despite an
admonition that they should not.45 For both of these types of cases,
the predominant question for appellate courts is whether the trial
judge conducted a sufficient inquiry about the nature and scope of
the jurors' discussions to determine whether they were prejudicial
to the defendant. For example, in United States v. Klee,4 jurors en-
gaged in discussion despite being instructed not to do so. 47 The
court held that the test of whether a new trial was warranted by this
before its final submission to them or because they are told, in effect, that they may
so discuss it.
Id. at 198.
38. Id. at 199.
39. Id. at 198 (quoting Midgett v. State, 164 A.2d 526, 533 (Md. 1960)).
40. 762 F.2d 867 (11th Cir. 1985).
41. See id. at 880-81.
42. 621 F.2d 460 (1st Cir. 1980).
43. Id. at 464 (holding that the defendant's failure to object to the admonition at trial
barred the appellate court from considering the matter).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1347 (4th Cir. 1996).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 395-96 (9th Cir. 1974); Holland v. State, 587 So. 2d 848, 872-74 (Miss.
1991).
46. 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1974).
47. See id. at 395.
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juror misconduct was whether the defendant had been prejudiced
to the extent that he did not receive a fair trial.48
These cases indicate that the trial judge has an obligation to
conduct some inquiry into the prejudicial effect of juror miscon-
duct. Thus, in Holland v. State,49 the court ruled that the trial
judge's curative instruction that the jurors refrain from further de-
liberations until after they had heard evidence and instructions
concerning sentencing was insufficient to overcome the prejudice
inherent in the jury's premature deliberations. 50 A cursory inquiry
generally will not survive appellate scrutiny.51
As is the case for all juror misconduct cases, the decisions of the
appellate courts reflect the tension between upholding the integ-
rity of trial procedures and respecting the finality of jury verdicts.
Typically, only those violations that prejudice the defendant's right
to an impartial jury and a fair trial will require a new trial; incon-
sequential lapses by the jury will be held harmless.52
An interesting facet of these cases is the tension between the
appellate courts' insistence on procedural regularity and the prac-
tical experience of the trial judges concerning jury behavior and
decision making. In all of the post- Winebrenner cases, the judges
who favored juror discussions struggled to formulate an admoni-
tion that would survive appellate scrutiny. In many cases, the
appellate courts ruled that instructions permitting juror discus-
sions were harmless error, particularly if the judge included in the
admonition a strong caution against forming opinions about the
ultimate issues to be decided by the jury.3 Nevertheless, appellate
48. See id. at 396 (noting that "not every incident of juror misconduct requires a new
trial").
49. 587 So. 2d 848 (Miss. 1991).
50. See id. at 874. After finding the defendant guilty in a capital murder trial, but be-
fore hearing evidence for the sentencing phase, the jury sent a note to the judge saying:
"We, the jury, sentence GeraldJames Holland to death." Id. at 872.
51. See, for example, United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 691 (3d Cir. 1993), in which the
jury disregarded the judge's admonition concerning juror discussions. In a written survey,
the judge asked each juror whether the juror had discussed the case with other jurors and,
if so, if the juror had formed an opinion about the guilt or non-guilt of the defendant. See
id. at 688.
52. In United States v. Abrams, 137 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1998), for example, the trial
judge-who had forgotten to instruct the jury that they should not engage in premature
discussions-refused a request by defendant's counsel to conduct an inquiry about the
nature and scope ofjuror discussions. See id. at 705-06. The court held that this was not an
abuse of discretion given that any discussions that would have taken place could only have
involved superficial aspects of the case. See id. at 708. After lunch on the first day of trial, a
juror sent a note to the judge asking him to instruct thejury not to discuss the case. See id. at
705. The only evidence presented that morning, after opening statements by the attorneys,
was foundational testimony by an IRS agent concerning that agency's methods of reviewing
tax bills. See id.
53. See, e.g., United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 880 (11th Cir. 1985).
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courts generally rule that such admonitions constitute error-and
therein lies a fundamental difference of perspective between ap-
pellate and trial judges. 4 Note, for example, the colloquy between
the trial judge and the defendant's counsel in United States v.
Abran&.5
The Court: The jury may be of the mind to think they can
discuss this case during the trial. I thought I told them they
can't.
Mr. Aronwald: I think you did. I think you told them that
when you excused them Tuesday night. I think you said they
are not permitted to discuss the case.
The Court: I meant discuss it with outsiders. Normally, I tell
the jury, as part of my general instructions, that they are not
to discuss it even among themselves. There is nothing im-
proper in the jury's discussing the case among themselves
before they reach deliberations. There is nothing ipso facto
wrong with it. It is just not a good idea, and I tell the jury not
to do it.... I don't know that there is anything wrong with
the jury's discussing the case.56
Perhaps the most forceful argument for permitting juror discus-
sions was made by the trial judge in United States v. Wexler 7 who
focused first on the assumptions underlying the standard admoni-
tion and then on the benefits that might be realized by permitting
58such discussions. Citing the arguments made in Commonwealth v.
Kerpan,59 Judge Ditter first disputed the assumption that permitting
jurors to discuss evidence will necessarily be prejudicial to the de-
fendant.60 He stated:
54. Not all appellate judges concur on this question. In Winebrenner, for example,
Judge Woodrough, in a strong dissent, found the majority decision to be highly impractical:
"No normal honest Americans ever worked together in a common inquiry for any length of
time with their mouths sealed up like automatons or oysters. The unnatural conduct of the
single juror who never said a word except 'That's the way I'm votin,' [draws] natural suspi-
cion." Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 330 (8th Cir. 1945) (Woodrough, J.,
dissenting).
55. 137 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1998).
56. Id. at 706.
57. 657 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Wexler,
838 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988).
58. See id. at 968-70.
59. 498 A.2d 829 (Pa. 1985).
60. Wexler, 657 F. Supp. at 968.
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[T]he order in which the evidence is presented ... is no
more a reason for prohibiting jury discussion than it is for en-
couraging it. It assumes that discussion will inevitably lead a
juror to an opinion but that the absence of discussion will
mean that no juror will reach an opinion on anything. This is
an unvarnished non-sequitor which needs only to be stated to
be exposed."
The judge also disputed the assumption that jurors who express
an opinion are less likely to change their minds than jurors who
remain silent:
[This assumption] has the ring of pop psychology but is based
upon an assumption which is, to my knowledge untested and,
to my mind, unbelievable.... I believe that the vast majority
of jurors are concerned, responsible, conscientious citizens
who take most seriously the job at hand. I find it difficult to
believe that as a group they are more interested in justifying
their own loosely formed notions than in doingjustice.
The judge then articulated two primary reasons for permitting
juror discussions in this case. First, Judge Ditter stated his belief
that his instructions to the jury would be sufficient to overcome the
objections traditionally raised by juror discussions.3 Second, he
emphasized that discussions would enhance juror attention, com-
prehension, and ability to recall evidence, thus improving juror
performance:
The duty of a juror involves complex thought processes: as-
similating and comprehending the evidence, determining
credibility issues, recalling the evidence, putting it all into
context and relative degrees of reliability, participating in dis-
cussions, and making informed decisions. Jurors need all the
help they can get and their only source of untainted informa-
tion and assistance is from those who share with them the
responsibility for making the ultimate decisions.64
There was also a third reason that Judge Ditter permitted the
jury to discuss the case:
61. Id. Judge Ditter also noted that the defendant did not present any testimony in the
case, making the sequence of evidence argument academic. See id. at 968 n.3.
62. Id. at 968.
63. See id. at 969.
64. Id.
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[O]ne of the jurors asked if they could discuss matters among
themselves. This suggested to me that he was thinking, a trait
that I believed should be encouraged. Had I said no, I would
have been unable to explain why--because I could not then,
nor can I now, think of any valid reason to preclude such dis-
cussion and a simple no would have left the jurors with the
distinct feeling that the ways of the law are mysterious in-
deed .... [T]o tell them they are not to discuss the matter
runs contrary to what they would normally be expected to do.
I strongly believe that... this instruction ... is the one thing
judges tell jurors that they are most likely to ignore.... I
firmly believe that jurors are more likely to do that which
makes sense than to follow a command which is never ex-
plained because it is completely unexplainable. 5
Right or wrong, Judge Ditter is in the minority among trial and
appellate judges in published opinions concerning juror trial dis-
16cussions. Most of the published opinions take a more
disapproving tone, warning of potential negative consequences
such as prejudgment and bias, even if they conclude that allowing
juror discussions is harmless error.67 Although it overturned Wex-
ler's conviction on other grounds, the Third Circuit took strong
exception to Judge Ditter's endorsement of trial discussions:
"While the trial court believed that such discussion would enhance
'assimilation, comprehension, and recollection,' . . . we believe
that the firmly-rooted prohibition against premature jury discus-
sion is well-founded. An instruction that permits the jurors to
discuss the evidence before conclusion of the case is erroneous."68
III. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OFJURY DISCUSSIONS DURING TRIAL
Judge Ditter was among the first proponents of the current jury
reform movement. Had he been a member of the Arizona bench,
we suspect that he would have felt quite at home on the Arizona
Supreme Court's Committee on the More Effective Use of Juries.
In its final report, the committee describes a number of possible
65. Id. at 969-70.
66. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 13-65 and accompanying text.
68. Wexler, 838 F.2d at 92 n.3 (quoting Wexler, 657 F. Supp. at 969).
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benefits to allowing jurors to discuss the evidence during the trial,69
including improving jury comprehension, 70 asking questions and
sharing impressions on a timely basis,71 testing individual jurors'
tentative and preliminary judgments against the group's knowl-
edge, 2 and reducing the formation of divisive cliques or forbidden
conversations among jurors.73
Analysis of the role of deliberation in jury trials suggests that the
advantages that deliberation brings to jury fact-finding could also
be produced by trial discussions. 4 In fact, the benefits could be
even more pronounced if the opportunity to exchange questions
and views of the evidence is permitted earlier in the trial.75 In an
article entitled Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, Professor Phoebe
Ellsworth responds affirmatively to the question posed in the title
with evidence that jury deliberation has a significant and positive
influence on jury competence.76 During deliberation, jurors with
erroneous or idiosyncratic views of the evidence must defend their
views and are forced to confront the fact that others on the jury
take different approaches to the evidence.77 One function of jury
deliberation is the correction of factual misstatements and errors
made by individual jurors.7 Thus, the opportunity to discuss the
case with other jurors plays a major role in promoting the compe-
tence and integrity of the decision. 9
The National Center for State Courts' report, Jury Trial Innova-
tions, summarizes a number of potential advantages of trial
discussions.s° Drawing on psychological research and legal com-
mentary, it lists the following possible benefits of allowing jurors to
discuss the evidence during trial:
1. Juror discussions about the evidence can improve
juror comprehension by permitting jurors to sift
through and mentally organize the evidence into a
coherent picture over the course of the trial.
69. See JURORS: THE POWER OF TWELVE: REPORT OF THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
COMMITTEE ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES 96-99 (1994) [hereinafter JURORS: THE
POWER OF TWELVE].




74. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
76. See Ellsworth, supra note 4, at 205-08.
77. See id. at 206.
78. See id. at 217.
79. See id. at 223.
80. See MUNSTERMAN, ET AL., JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 31.
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2. Juror discussions about the evidence may improve
juror recollection of evidence and testimony by
emphasizing and clarifying important points during
the course of the trial.
3. Juror discussions about the evidence may increase
juror satisfaction by permitting an outlet for jurors
to express their impressions of the case before retir-
ing for deliberations.
4. Jurors discussions about the evidence may promote
greater cohesion among the jurors, reducing the
amount of time needed for deliberations.
5. Jurors find it difficult to adhere to admonitions
about not discussing evidence. Permission to en-
gage in such discussions bridges the gap between
the court's admonitions and jurors' activities.1
IV. POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS OF JURY DISCUSSIONs DURING TRIAL
Our survey of legal cases provides several justifications for pro-
hibitingjuror discussions during trial. As we saw, a prime concern
in allowing trial discussions in criminal trials is that they may un-
fairly benefit the prosecution, which presents its case first.82 It is
thought that jurors' expression of initial opinions during the pres-
entation of the prosecution's case will have the effect of shifting
the burden of proof to the defendant. 3 In a civil lawsuit, the ad-
vantage would accrue to the plaintiff who presents his or her case
first.84 The Jury Trial Innovations report details the full range of
concerns about the procedure, including the possibility of prema-
ture decision making:
1. Juror discussions of the evidence facilitate or en-
courage the formation or expression of premature
judgments about an evidentiary issue or the result
of the case.
2. An aggressive, overpowering juror might dominate
discussions and have undue influence on the views
of others.
81. Id. at 139 .
82. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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3. Allowing juror discussions prior to deliberations
may detract from the ideal of the juror as a neutral
decision maker.
4. The quality of deliberations may decline as jurors
become more familiar with each other's views.
5. Sanctioned and structured discussions might pro-
duce a narrower and more confined set of final
deliberations.
6. Juror stress might increase because of the conflicts
produced by prior discussions. 5
In Arizona, civil jurors are specifically admonished to refrain
from making up their minds until all of the evidence and legal in-
structions have been presented.86 Furthermore, judges instruct
jurors to limit their trial discussions to the evidence.87 However, the
effectiveness of the admonition is unknown. If jurors express their
views about who should win the case early on, it might make it
more difficult to change their minds later.88 Public statements of
opinion encourage commitment to that opinion."9 Another poten-
tial problem is that trial discussions could lead jurors to adopt the
same shared biases about the evidence, which would be difficult to
overcome during final deliberations. In testimony before the Judi-
ciary Committee of the California State Senate, which was
considering jury reform, psychologist Robert MacCoun observed:
[P] sychologists do not consider "active information process-
ing" to be an unequivocally good thing. These cognitive
85. MUNSTERMAN, supra note 31, at 139-40.
86. A proposed preliminary instruction recommended by the Arizona Supreme Court
Committee on More Effective Use ofJuries includes the following admonition:
During the trial you may talk with each other about the evidence, but only privately
in the jury room during recesses when all jurors are present. However, do not make
up your minds about guilt or innocence [who should win the case] until you have
heard a/! the evidence, my instructions of law, arguments of counsel and your delib-
erations have begun. Unless I tell you otherwise, do not discuss the case with anyone
other than anotherjuror.
JURORS: THE POWER OF TWELVE, supra note 69, at app. C-1.
87. See id.
88. See SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 202-04 (1988).
89. See id. at 204; see also supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
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processes facilitate selective recall rather than total recall, and
can make us form a biased impression of the evidence.
A strength of the jury is that deliberation provides an oppor-
tunity for individual biases to "cancel each other out." The
danger of formal discussions during trial is that jurors will
prematurely adopt the same shared biases before hearing all
the evidence, undermining some of the benefits of post-trial
deliberation."0
In sum, those who support allowing jurors to discuss the evi-
dence during the trial believe that it may enhance juror
comprehension, memory, and group decision making, since jurors
are allowed to discuss and debate the evidence in a timely fashion.
Critics are concerned that jurors allowed to discuss the case before
deliberation may weigh early evidence more heavily, or may make
up their minds prematurely.
V. THE ARIZONA JURY REFORM
After carefully weighing the pluses and minuses of allowing ju-
rors to discuss the evidence during the trial, the Arizona Supreme
Court's Committee on More Effective Use of Juries recommended
that the practice be incorporated into Arizona civil jury trials."'
When the Arizona Supreme Court approved the use of trial discus-
sions in civil jury trials in the Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 39 (f),
Arizona became the first jurisdiction that expressly permits civil
jurors to discuss evidence during the trial.
92
Both the potential benefits and the potential drawbacks of this
technique make it one worth examining with care. If trial discus-
sions improve the jury's ability to comprehend and apply complex
testimony and law, that addresses some of the most serious criti-
cisms of the contemporary jury system. Yet, if it causes premature
opinion formation, regularly advantaging the plaintiff or the state
at the expense of the defendant, it may undermine the impartiality
of our adversary legal system.
90. Robert MacCoun, IMPROVING JURY COMPREHENSION IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL TRI-
ALS 2 (RAND Testimony Series No. CT-136, July 1995). MacCoun went on to urge the
Judiciary Committee that, if it was interested in recommending the use of juror trial discus-
sions in California, it test their impact experimentally before widespread adoption. See id.
91. SeeJuRoRs: THE POWER OF TWELVE, supra note 69, at 96-99.
92. SeeARIZ.R.Cv.P.39(f).
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So far, these imputed benefits and harms are only hypothetical.
To date, there has been no systematic study of this reform. It is not
known whether or how the practice of contemporaneous discus-
sion affects decision making, or even what transpires during the
talks that jurors have with one another as the trial proceeds.
VI. THE ARIZONA TRIAL DISCUSSIONS PROJECT: METHODOLOGY
We recently completed data collection in a field experiment that
tested the impact of trial discussions. The procedure and materials
of the study were specifically calculated to address both the poten-
93tial benefits and the drawbacks of trial discussions. To permit an
experimental test of the reform, the Arizona Supreme Court is-
sued an administrative order allowing trial judges in civil trials to
depart from normal practice and instruct jurors in some trials that
they may not discuss the evidence until final deliberations.94
In the study, approximately 100 civil jury trials were randomly
assigned to an experimental "trial discussions" condition, whereas
an equal number of civil jury trials were randomly assigned to a
control "no discussions" condition. Jurors were instructed by the
trial judge that they could (or could not) engage in trial discus-
sions depending on the condition to which their case had been
randomly assigned. For both conditions, questionnaires were dis-
tributed to jurors, judges, attorneys, and litigants, and a case data
form that asked for information about the case was included in the
package for judges. Judges in Maricopa, Pima, Mohave, and Yava-
pai County Superior Courts participated in the study.
The questionnaires asked trial participants about their observa-
tions and experiences throughout the trial, judgments about the
weight of the evidence, and reactions to the jury verdict. Jurors in
the experimental condition were also asked additional questions
about any discussions they had during the trial. To efisure that our
methodology was appropriate and the data collection procedures
were logistically possible, we conducted a pretest of the study in
February 1997 for twelve cases in the Maricopa County Superior
93. Members of the project's Advisory Committee made many valuable suggestions
about the design and execution of the study. The Advisory Committee includes: Hon. B.
Michael Dann (Maricopa County Superior Court), Shari Seidman Diamond (American Bar
Foundation and University of Illinois at Chicago), Hon. Judith McConnell (San Diego
County Superior Court), Hon.Judith E. Retchin (D.C. Superior Court), G. Marc Whitehead
(McDermott, Will, & Emery), and Elizabeth Wiggins (Federal Judicial Center).
94. See Arizona Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 97-1 (1997).
WINTER 1999]
Univerity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Court. We also interviewed a dozen Arizona civil jurors from the
pretest cases to obtain qualitative information about how jurors
reacted to the opportunity to engage in trial discussions.
We are in the midst of data analysis now. We plan to compare
the participants in the control and experimental groups to deter-
mine whether and how the opportunity to discuss the evidence
during the trial affects jury decision making. We have included
specific questions about the point at which jurors started leaning
toward one side or another and at which they made up their minds
about who should win the case; questions about the usefulness of
the trial discussions for understanding law and evidence in the
case; questions designed to test for primacy and recency effects;
and other items about the individual and group decision process.
By comparing jury and judge questionnaires, we should be able to
determine whether the reform brings jury verdicts more (or less)
in agreement with the judge's assessment of the weight of the evi-
dence.
VII. THE ARIZONA TRIAL DISCUSSIONS PROJECT: EARLY RESULTS
Some early results about the views that judges, jurors, attorneys,
and litigants hold about the Rule 39(f) reform are already avail-
able. Analysis of these views is important because serious
reservations about the reform by trial participants and by those
who engage in trial discussions would be cause for concern. Judges
who participated in the study have had several years of experience
with the reform and are in a good position to report on apparent
benefits and problems that may be obvious outside the jury room.
The views of attorneys and especially litigants are worthy of analysis
because a court reform that creates concerns among the parties in
litigation might be seen as violating the important principle of
procedural justice. In addition, the jurors themselves have the
most information about the practical effects of the reform and how
it may have benefited or interfered with their decision making.
Finally, we present here data from juror questionnaires about how




A. Views ofJudges, Litigants, and Attorneys About Trial Discussions
Overall, the majority of judges and jurors support the rule per-
mitting jurors to discuss the evidence during trial and see a
number of benefits to the reform. Attorneys and litigants are di-
vided in their views of the reform. Table 1 presents comparisons
for several questions tapping views of the reform on the part of
judges, litigants, and attorneys.95
B. The Views ofJudges
When questioned about permitting jurors to discuss the evi-
dence during trial, judges were the most enthusiastic group. From
our total group of approximately 190 valid cases, we received judi-
cial questionnaires from 167 trials, representing forty Arizona
judges. At the time of the study, the reform had been in place in
civil trials for approximately two-and-a-half years, so most judges
responding to the survey were likely to have presided over civil jury
trials in which jurors were permitted to discuss the evidence during
the trial. About three-quarters (twenty-nine of forty judges) indi-
cated that they supported the reform, five (13 percent) said they
were neutral, and six (15 percent) opposed the reform.96
Judicial estimates about how the reform affects jury decision
making are in line with this overall support. Approximately three-
quarters of the judges agree that juror discussions help jurors un-
derstand the evidence, and 30 percent believe that jurors who
engage in these discussions prejudge the evidence. Furthermore,
these views are all highly and significantly correlated with one an-
other such that the judges who believe that trial discussions
improve juror comprehension and disagree that they encourage
premature decision making are most supportive of the reform.97
95. See infra tbl.1.
96. Judges sometimes differed in their ratings of support for the reform from trial to
trial. Therefore, for Table 1, in calculating support and in assessing the beliefs about the
impact of the reform, we employed the modal (most common) response for each judge and
used the mean value when there were multiple modes for a particularjudge.
97. We examined the relationships among judicial views using two methods. First, we
undertook correlational analyses in which we examined the strength and direction of the
relationships between judicial support and other views using responses in all 167 cases. In
these analyses, we found that judicial support for the reform is significantly and positively
related to beliefs that it improves juror comprehension (r = .78, p < .0001) and significantly
and negatively related to views that it encourages premature decisions (r = -.66, p < .0001).
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C. Attorney and Litigant Views
When compared to judges, attorneys and litigants are more
negative about the reform. One caveat about the attorney and liti-
gant data is that the response rates for these two groups were much
lower than for judges and jurors whose participation rates ex-
ceeded 85 percent. Attorneys contributed questionnaires in about
half of the cases in the sample, and litigants responded in ap-
proximately a third of the trials. It is quite possible that support or
opposition to the reform could have affected attorneys' and liti-
gants' willingness to respond.
Among those who did respond, about half of each group think
that trial discussions improve juror understanding of the evidence,
but a similar percentage think that trial discussions might also en-
courage premature decision making. About half say they feel, or
would feel, comfortable having jurors engage in trial discussions.
Forty-seven percent of the litigants and 51 percent of the attorneys
support the reform. As with the judges, attorneys' views about the
reform and support for it are highly correlated; the strongest sup-
porters are those who perceive more benefits and fewer
drawbacks. 98
Many of the major concerns about the reform pertain to the
supposed advantages it brings to the state (in criminal trials) or to
the plaintiff (in civil trials) who presents the case first.99 It is very
interesting to note, therefore, that there are no observable differ-
ences between attorneys who represent defendants and attorneys
who represent plaintiffs in their support for or opposition to the
reform. °0 For instance, 32 percent of plaintiff attorneys and 33
percent of defense attorneys state that they are opposed to the re-
Beliefs in the benefit to juror comprehension are also significantly and negatively related to
views about its drawback in encouraging premature decisions (r= -.49, p< .0001).
Second, to control statistically for the fact that judges made multiple responses in differ-
ent trials, we confirmed the above relationships through an analysis of variance using
support for the reform as the dependent variable, the judge's identity as a random factor,
and the other views (about encouraging premature decision making and improving under-
standing) as covariates. Similar results were obtained; both sets of beliefs were significantly
related to support for the reform. In addition, the identity of the judge was related to sup-
port for the reform.
98. Attorneys' support for the reform is significantly and positively related to comfort
with it (r = .93, p < .0001) and beliefs that it improves jury comprehension (r = .86, p <
.0001). Support is significantly and negatively related to views that trial discussions encour-
age premature decision making (r= -.72, p < .0001). All of these dimensions are significantly
intercorrelated as well.
99. See Winebrenner v. United States, 147 F.2d 322, 328 (8th Cir. 1945), discussed su-
pra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
100. t(197) < 1, ns.
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form. There are no significant differences between plaintiff and
defense attorneys in their views about whether trial discussions im-
prove jury comprehension or encourage premature decisions, and
neither group expresses greater comfort with the rule.
There were two characteristics of attorneys that were related to
their support for trial discussions. Both plaintiff and defense attor-
neys who reported more jury trial experience were less supportive
of the reform.1' Attorneys who said they had tried more than 100
jury cases were the most negative, with approximately two-thirds of
that group opposing the rule. In addition, plaintiff attorneys with a
higher proportion of their work devoted to Arizona civil practice
were more likely to support the reform; there was no such rela-
tionship for defense attorneys."'
As with the judges and attorneys, litigants who believed that trial
discussions improved juror comprehension felt that it did not en-
courage premature discussion, and those who were comfortable
with having jurors discuss the evidence during trial were more
likely to support Rule 39(f). °3 There was an effect for litigant in-
come, with wealthier litigants expressing less support for the
reform;0 4 these litigants were less likely to believe that allowing ju-
rors to discuss the evidence would improve the quality of their
decision making.
105
The figures just presented include participants from all trials,
including both those in which jurors were allowed to discuss the
evidence during trial and those in which they were not due to the
random assignment. The support of judges and attorneys for Rule
39(f) was not affected by the assignment of cases to experimental
or control conditions, probably because they had already had
some experience with the reform independent of the assigned
condition. However, it did have an impact on the views of litigants.
Comparing the responses of litigants in cases with and without trial
discussions reveals that there is more support for trial discussions if
they are allowed in the case at hand. Litigants whose cases were
randomly assigned to permitjuror discussions are more likely than
litigants in the control group to support the reform.
0 6
101. r= -.24 for plaintiff attorneys and r= -.23 for defense attorneys, both p's < .03.
102. r = .23, p = .03 for plaintiff attorneys; r = .09, ns for defense attorneys.
103. The correlations with Rule 39(f) support were all strong and statistically signifi-
cant: r= .85 for comfort; .81 for beliefs that it improves jury comprehension; and -.50 for the
view that it encourages premature decision making. All p-values are < .0001.
104. r=-.28,p= .009.
105. r=-.33,p=.001.
106. t(102) = -2.56, p = .01. The average rating of litigants whose cases were randomly
assigned to the control group was 3.55, compared to a mean of 4.69 for the litigants whose
juries were permitted to discuss the evidence during trial.
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Researchers Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod, in a study of an-
other jury reform, found a similar pattern in which exposure to a
reform increases support for it.1 7 In their study of an experiment
allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses, Heuer and Penrod
report that before participating in a trial in which jurors were
permitted to ask questions, attorneys were negative"°8 and judges
were undecided' °9 about the practice." ° After they had participated
in such a trial, however, both judges and attorneys became more
positive, with judges moving up to a moderate endorsement of the
procedure"' and attorneys moving closer to a neutral zone. Note
also the similar pattern that, when it comes to at least these two
instances of jury reform, attorneys tend to be more critical than
judges in their evaluations of the reforms.
D. Jurors' Views of and Experiences with Trial Discussions
Questionnaires completed by jurors who decided civil cases pro-
vide a limited quantitative look at how jurors described trial
discussions. Half of the jurors were randomly assigned to cases in
which they were permitted by the judge to discuss the evidence,
and the analyses in this section are limited to this group of jurors.
Of the 686 jurors who were permitted to discuss the evidence, ap-
proximately 70 percent report that their jury had at least one
discussion about the evidence during the trial. That means that 30
percent of the jurors who had the legal right to discuss the evi-
dence during trial reportedly did not do so.
Among the jurors in the experimental condition, jurors who re-
port actually discussing evidence during the trial are much more
positive about the reform than jurors who report no discussions.
107. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials Through
Note Taking and Question Asking, 79JUDICATURE 256, 259 (1996).
108. Median response of 6.3 on a 9-point scale, where I = strongly agree with permit-
ing juror questions and 9 = strongly disagree with permitting questions. See id. at 261.
109. Median response of 4.5. See id.
110. See id.
111. Median = 3.7. See id.
112. Median = 4.9. See id.
113. To do this analysis, we limited the cases to those in which we were able to confirm
that the judge had followed the experimental assignment and had instructed jurors that
they either should or should not discuss the evidence during trial. Then, for each jury in the
experimental condition, we calculated the mean rating of support for the reform. Compar-
ing the experimental juries who reported discussing the evidence during trial with those
who said they engaged in no discussions, we found that those who actually engaged in trial
discussions were much more favorable about them. The mean rating of support for juries
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That is the same pattern found with litigants, in which experience
with the reform appears to increase support for it. However, there
is another possible explanation for why jurors who experienced
trial discussions are more positive. Jurors who were more negative
about the reform might have declined to engage in jury discus-
sions precisely because of their opposition.
E. Jurors' Views of the Benefits of Trial Discussions
Tables 2 and 3 indicate the responses of jurors who engaged in
trial discussions to a variety of questions that asked them about the
potential benefits and drawbacks of trial discussions.14 As Table 2
indicates, jurors expressed highly favorable views of trial discus-
sions, saying that trial evidence was remembered very accurately
during these discussions, and the discussions helped them under-
stand the evidence in the case. The jurors overwhelmingly agree
that all jurors' points of view were considered in the trial discus-
sions, disagreeing that the trial discussions were dominated by one
or twojurors.
Consistent with these survey data and the Arizona Supreme
Court Committee on the Effective Use of Juries, the jurors we in-
terviewed concurred that a prime benefit of trial discussions is that
jurors can compare notes and questions about the evidence in a
timely fashion. A juror in a case in which there was moderate use
of trial discussions thought that the following:
[Discussions] were helpful to the standpoint that in most
cases most of the questions you were thinking about yourself
anyway and this way it was out in the open and you didn't
have to do it on your own ... You have immediate questions
all the time and it certainly answers them right now and you
don't have to feel like you're alone, there are . .. other peo-
ple there too.1
5
Views about the benefits of trial discussions are strongly linked
to support for them. The most powerful predictor of a juror's
that engaged in no discussions was 4.49, while the mean rating of support for juries that did
discuss was 5.63, t(82) =-5.75, p < .0001.
114. Seeinftatbls. 2,3.
115. Videotaped interview by Valerie Hans & Paula Hannaford with Juror 4, in Phoe-
nix, Ariz. (Mar. 7, 1997). Additional information regarding this interview may be found on
file with the authors.
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support for the reform is the view that trial discussions improve
jury comprehension. Jurors who say that trial discussions improve
jury comprehension are highly likely to support the reform.1 6
Those who agree that the discussion of evidence was very accurate,
that trial discussions helped resolve confusion, and that all jurors'
views were considered are also more likely to endorse the re-
form." 7 In addition, jurors who participated a fair amount and saw
themselves as influential in the jury discussions were more favor-
able to the reform."'
F. Jurors' Views of the Drawbacks of Trial Discussions
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate that, although most jurors are very fa-
vorable about the opportunity to engage in trial discussions and
see considerable benefits to it, a minority appears to have some
reservations. First, approximately 30 percent of the juries given the
opportunity to discuss choose not to do so. The juror interviews
done during the pretest phase of the project provided us with
some possible reasons why jurors might not discuss the trial evi-
dence even if permitted to do so."9 Most significant are logistical
problems. The jurors we interviewed said that there are difficulties
in attempting to get all jurors together at the same time, as re-
quired by Rule 39(f). In addition, some jurors we interviewed
reported their initial surprise and uncertainty about whether or
not it is really legal to discuss the evidence during trial.
1 2 0
116. The correlation is .63, p < .0001, accounting for forty percent of the variation in
support for trial discussions. To control statistically for the fact that jurors participated to-
gether and were not completely independent, we undertook additional analyses of variance
in which the support for trial discussions was the dependent variable, the jury on which a
participant had served was a random factor, and the participant's view of the value of trial
discussions in improving jury comprehension was a covariate. This secondary analysis con-
firmed the strong relationship between reports that it improved jury comprehension and
support for the reform.
117. Correlations range from .12 to .22, all modest size but statistically significant at p <
.05. Analyses of variance with each of the listed factors as covariates and the jury as a ran-
dom factor confirmed the significant relationships described in the text.
118. Again, both correlational analyses (-'s = .12 and .15 for participation and per-
ceived influence, respectively, both p's < .008) and analysis of variance confirmed the
positive relationship between participation, perceived influence, and support for trial dis-
cussions.
119. See Valerie P. Hans et al., Letting Jurors Talk: An Analysis of the Arizona Jury Re-
form Permitting Pre-Deliberation Discussion by CivilJurors (June 1997) (unpublished) (on
file with the authors). This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Law & Society
Association, St. Louis, MO.
120. After learning this information during the pretest, we crafted a suggested instruc-
tions for judges that further clarified for civil jurors that they are now able to discuss the
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Consider some of the following quotes from jurors we inter-
viewed:
I was shocked.... I thought, did I hear her right? I still didn't
believe it. Even when we got to the room, I still wasn't sure.121
I was just a little bit surprised. I still felt a little bit uncomfort-
able because of prior knowledge that you're not supposed to
talk about things ahead of time.
12
I guess I didn't believe it at first that we could do it but it
turned out to be a positive thing, I think.
23
Some of us were still sort of afraid to discuss things. Even
though it was said we were still wondering what we could talk
about and what we couldn't. There were a few people who
had been on juries before, but of course the new reforms
though, but they didn't want to do something that might
make it unfair or unethical.
2 4
evidence during the trial, despite the fact that they may have thought such discussions were
prohibited based on prior experience or information. The suggested instruction read as
follows:
You jurors may discuss the evidence during the trial, but only among yourselves and
only in the jury room when all of you are present. Despite what you have heard about
or experienced in other trials, where jurors cannot discuss the evidence among
themselves during the trial, that rule has been changed in Arizona to permitjurors to
talk with each other about the evidence during trials in civil cases like this one. The
kinds of things you may discuss include the witnesses, their testimony and exhibits.
However, you must be very careful not to discuss or make up your minds about the
final outcome, or who should win the case, until you have heard everything-all the
evidence, the final instructions of law, and the attorneys' arguments--and your de-
liberations have begun. Obviously, it would be unfair and unwise to decide the case
until you have heard everything.
Suggested Jury Instructions (unpublished) (on file with the authors).
121. Videotaped interview by Valerie Hans & Paula Hannaford with Juror 1, in Phoe-
nix, Ariz. (Mar. 7, 1997). Additional information regarding this interview may be found on
file with the authors.
122. Videotaped interview by Valerie Hans & Paula Hannaford with Juror 2, in Phoe-
nix, Ariz. (Mar. 7, 1997). Additional information regarding this interview may be found on
file with the authors.
123. Audiotaped telephone interview by Valerie Hans & Paula Hannaford with Juror 12
(Mar. 26, 1997). Additional information regarding this interview may be found on file with
the authors.
124. Audiotaped telephone interview by Paula Hannaford with Juror 9 (Mar 25, 1997).
Additional information regarding this interview may be found on file with the authors.
WINTER 1999]
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform
In addition to the logistical problems and jurors' own hesitancy,
there is some evidence that a minority of jurors are worried that
extensive discussions might encourage premature decision making
or improper influence. In the field study, about a quarter of the
jurors who engaged in at least one discussion agree that "trial dis-
cussions encourage jurors to make up their minds early on, before
all the evidence and the law is presented." This figure is much
lower than the litigants and attorneys, although it is close to that of
the judges. Nevertheless, it is still a substantial minority. Not sur-
prisingly, jurors who believe that trial discussions encourage
premature decision making are less likely to support the reform."5
Jurors who reported more conflict on their jury were also less en-
amored with the reform.
2 6
Jurors we interviewed occasionally reflected concerns about the
potential for prejudgment or inappropriate influence. For exam-
ple, one juror said she was uncomfortable discussing the case
before all the evidence was in, thinking that "it's better to think
about it independently and then pool your impressions."2 7 An-
other juror we interviewed observed:
I think I had this strong feeling that if I talked about it a lot
before all the facts were in I might get some biases; once
you've said something you kind of feel that you've made a
proclamation that you have to stand behind. If you haven't
said anything it's easier to change your mind. I think most of
us there seemed to have that same feeling. We'll talk about it
when we get all the facts.1
28
Thus, at least some jurors show reluctance to engage in trial dis-
cussions because of the concern that they, or others, might
prejudge the case.
125. The relationship between support for trial discussions and belief that they encour-
age premature decision making is -.22, p < .0001. Analysis of variance confirmed the
statistical significance of the relationship while controlling for the fact that the jurors were
not independent.
126. The relationship is statistically significant (r= -.11, p = .006). Analysis of variance
confirmed the pattern.
127. Videotaped interview by Valerie Hans & Paula Hannaford with Juror 5, in Phoe-
nix, Ariz. (Mar. 8, 1997). Additional information regarding this interview may be found on
file with the authors.
128. Videotaped interview by Valerie Hans & Paula Hannaford with Juror 7, in Phoe-
nix, Ariz. (Mar. 8, 1997). Additional information regarding this interview may be found on
file with the authors.
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CONCLUSION
The data provide some early evidence about the extent to which
jurors engage in trial discussions and their perceived benefits and
drawbacks. Jurors themselves are quite enthusiastic about the re-
form and claim that it has positive effects. At least by jurors' own
reports, discussing the evidence during the trial assists them in un-
derstanding and remembering the evidence, although a minority
of jurors express some reservations about the reform. Judges also
are relatively positive about the reform. Attorneys and litigants
were among the most negative, with about half of each group op-
posing the reform.
The more active approach to jury decision making that is dis-
cussed here is echoed in recent calls for educational reform. For
example, the Boyer Commission on Educating Undergraduates in
the Research University recently issued a report arguing that the
traditional lecture method of college teaching should be re-
vamped and replaced by more active learning approaches.2 9 The
report draws on studies showing that group problem-based learn-
ing can be a superior method of transmitting information to
students and training them to solve complex real world prob-
lems."" It is interesting to observe that the institution of the jury
already incorporates key elements of this ideal educational device
in that it consists of a group of citizens who work together to re-
solve an important social and political question. Revising the
traditions of the adversary system that curtail the jurors' ability to
question witnesses, and discuss evidence among themselves in a
timely fashion during the trial would bring the jury even closer to
the Boyer Commission's ideal educational model. Yet, would it
create bias or tip the scales of justice? It remains to be seen
whether the presumed benefits or drawbacks of jury trial discus-
sions are substantiated by the findings of the field experiment.13
129. See THE BOYER COMMISSION ON EDUCATING UNDERGRADUATES IN THE RESEARCH
UNIVERSITY, REINVENTING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION: A BLUEPRINT FOR AMERICA'S
RESEARCH UNIVERSITIES 15-16 (1996); see also Dann, supra note 9, at 1244-46 (arguing that
courtrooms should learn from the model of classrooms, which actively encourage interac-
tion and information exchange, and allow jurors to take a more active role in the
proceedings).
130. See Deborah E. Allen, et al., The Power of Problem-Based Learning in Teaching Introduc-
tory Science Courses, in BRINGING PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING TO HIGHER EDUCATION:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 43, 44-45 (LuAnn Wilkerson & Wim H. Gijselaers eds., 1996).
131. Our project is the first attempt to measure the effect of trial discussions. A second
project, also funded by the State Justice Institute, is now underway. Researchers Shari Dia-
mond and Neil Vidmar are assisting in the development of that project, which will take
place in the Pima County (Arizona) Superior Court. This project, which involves videotap-
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We plan to address that question in later publications. Although
the readers of our work may discuss these early findings among
themselves in the meantime, they are admonished to keep an open
mind.
TABLE 1
THE VIEWS OFJUDGES, LITIGANTS, AND
ATTORNEYS ABOUT TRIAL DISCUSSIONS
ITEM JUDGES LITIGANTS ATToRNEYS
(N=40) (N=I 12) (N=202)
Trial discussions improve juror 78% 61% 51%
understanding of evidence (% agreeing)
Trial discussions encourage jurors to make 30% 52% 55%
up their minds early on, before all the
evidence and the law is presented
(% agreeing)
Support reform (% supporting) 73% 47% 51%
Feel comfortable with jurors engaging in 51% 51%
trial discussions (% agreeing)
ing civil jury trials, including all trial discussions and deliberations, is designed to provide
more precise information on the substance and dynamics ofjuror discussions.
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TABLE 2
JURORS' VIEWS OF BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF TRIAL
DISCUSSIONS [MEAN RESPONSE, JURORS WHO WERE RANDOMLY
ASSIGNED To TRIAL DISCUSSIONS AND ENGAGED IN AT LEAST
ONE DISCUSSION (N=4 79)]
How accurately was the trial evidence 5.76
remembered during trial discussions?
(1=not at all accurately; 7=very accurately)
How helpful were these discussions for 5.63
resolving confusion about the testimony or
evidence presented during the trial? (1 =not
at all helpful; 7=very helpful)
How thoroughly were all jurors' points of 5.90
view considered during these discussions?
(1=not at all thoroughly; 7=very thoroughly)
How concerned were you about 2.70
inappropriately influencing or being
influenced by the opinions of the other jurors
by engaging in trial discussions? (1 =not at
all concerned; 7=very concerned)
To what extent would you say that one or 3.53
two jurors dominated these discussions?
(1=not at all; 7=very much)
TABLE 3
VIEWS ABOUT TRIAL DISCUSSIONS OF JURORS WHO WERE
RANDOMLY ASSIGNED To TRIAL DISCUSSIONS AND ENGAGED IN
AT LEAST ONE DISCUSSION (N= 4 79)
ITEM
Trial discussions improve juror understand- 81%
ing of evidence (% agreeing)
Trial discussions encourage jurors to make 26%
up their minds early on, before all the evi-
dence and the law is presented
(% agreeing)
Support reform (% supporting) 77%
Felt comfortable engaging in trial 83%
discussions (% agreeing)
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